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Abstract 
Do information flows matter for remittance behavior? We design and 
implement a randomized control trial to quantitatively assess the role 
of communication between migrants and their contacts abroad on the 
extent and value of remittance flows. In the experiment, a random 
sample of 1,500 migrants residing in Ireland was offered the possibility 
of contacting their networks outside the host country for free over a 
varying number of months. We find a sizable, positive impact of our 
intervention on the value of migrant remittances sent. Our results 
exclude that the remittance effect we identify is a simple substitution 
effect. Instead, our analysis points to this effect being a likely result of 
improved information via factors such as better migrant control over 
remittance use, enhanced trust in remittance channels due to 
experience sharing, or increased remittance recipients’ social pressure 
on migrants. 
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1. Introduction 
Migrant remittances have grown substantially over the past decades, while 
showing remarkable resilience in the face of recent economic crisis around the 
world. The financial flows generated by international migrants are surpassing the 
national public budget resources of some developing countries, as well as the 
Foreign Direct Investment and Official Development Aid flows these countries 
receive. It is therefore of great interest to learn more about the determinants and 
consequences of such important international financial flows.1 
One area of study crucial to understanding the determinants of migrant 
remittances concerns the relationship between migrants and their transnational 
networks, and how it affects migrant decisions to remit. Often, migrants are part of 
a transnational household that was separated by considerable geographic distance 
at the time of migration. Distance between migrants and their networks is likely to 
bring several consequences that may affect this relationship. For instance, this 
separation creates asymmetric information, in the sense that neither the migrant 
nor the network can accurately observe each others’ actions. In particular, at most 
times, the network outside the immigration country cannot accurately know the 
migrant’s occupation, earnings, or standard of living, while migrants cannot 
perfectly observe their networks’ true needs and uses of any financial transfers 
received. 
In this context, it becomes most relevant to examine the role of information 
flows between migrants and their network outside the country of immigration in 
determining migrant remittance behavior. One should note that the impact of 
these information flows on migrant transfers is eminently an empirical question. 
Indeed, one can conjecture about several possible mechanisms that could affect 
remittances in different directions. First, communication flows should contribute 
to an increase in the quantity and quality of information within transnational 
                                                      
 
1 See Yang (2011) for a recent literature review on this topic. 
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households, thereby mitigating asymmetric information problems, which could 
increase or decrease migrant remittances depending on the direction of earlier 
informational deficiencies. Second, additional contact between migrants and their 
networks may stimulate the demand for remittances on the recipients’ side, which 
would cause upward pressure on remittances. Third, the increased communication 
flows may lower the remittance costs and enhance trust in remittance channels due 
to experience sharing, which would likely increase remittance flows. A fourth 
mechanism could be that improved communication between migrants and their 
networks could actually substitute for remittances, in the sense that contacts by 
migrants may be interpreted as a form of attention and caring, a role that could 
alternatively be performed by remittances – in this instance, improved 
informational flows would have a negative impact on transfers sent by migrants. 
In this paper, we examine the role of information flows between migrants and 
their networks abroad in determining remittance behavior. To do so, we design a 
randomized control trial under which we vary the magnitude of information flows 
between migrants and their transnational networks, by distributing international 
calling credit to a randomly selected treatment group. This field experiment is 
conducted on a random sample of 1,500 immigrants residing in the greater Dublin 
area in Ireland. 
Our results show that the increased information flows that we generate 
experimentally have a significant and substantial role in raising the value of 
remittances sent to existing recipients. However, we find only modest support for 
the hypothesis that increased contact with non-remittance recipients positively 
affects the decision to remit to those individuals. 
The role of information flows on remittance behavior has been previously 
examined in the existing migration literature. McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman 
(2013) describe survey evidence according to which migrants underreport their 
earnings when they contact their family members in their country of origin, in 
order to moderate their remittance requests and limit new immigrant arrivals. This 
finding is consistent with ours, but we further show using experimental evidence 
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that increasing the quantity and quality of information exchanges between 
migrants and their transnational networks increases the amount of remittance 
flows.  
There are several recent papers on remittance-related strategic behavior by 
both migrants and their networks, when their relationship is characterized by 
asymmetric information. Ashraf, Aycinena, Martinez, and Yang (2011) find, in a 
randomized field experiment, that savings in migrant-origin households in El 
Salvador rise when migrants (in the US) are given new financial products that 
improve migrant control of savings in remittance-recipient households. Consistent 
with this finding, Batista, Silverman, and Yang (2013) use a lab-in-the-field 
experiment to show that urban individuals prefer to remit in kind (as opposed to in 
cash) in ways that express their preference to control recipient use of their 
transfers. Chen (2013) also finds evidence of non-cooperative behavior related to 
the use of household resources in migrant households. Finally, Ambler (2013) 
conducts a lab-in-the-field experiment confirming that remittance recipients use 
resources differently when migrants can monitor this use. All of this work is 
consistent with our finding that improving the quantity and quality of information 
flows, and hence diminishing asymmetric information problems, should increase 
remittance flows. 
An additional strand of related literature emphasizes the importance of 
transaction costs and trust in the remittance channel as determinants of remittance 
flows. Aycinena, Martinez, and Yang (2012) conducted a Randomized Control Trial  
(RCT) among Salvadorian migrants in the Washington D.C. area, showing that 
lower remittance costs increased both the magnitude and frequency of remittance 
flows, while Batista and Vicente (2013) also present experimental evidence, for 
migrants in Mozambique, indicating that lower remittance costs, but also the 
availability of a more trustworthy mobile banking remittance channel, increase the 
magnitude and frequency of remittance flows. These results are also consistent 
with our findings, in the sense that increased communication flows may lower 
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remittance costs and enhance trust in remittance channels, due to experience 
sharing between migrants and their network. 
Finally, the positive role of information flows on remittance behavior can also 
be related to better integration of migrants in their networks at the origin country. 
Chort, Gubert, and Senne (2012) and Batista and Umblijs (2013) emphasize how 
remittances are used as a reciprocation or insurance mechanism, from which 
migrants hope to benefit upon return to their home country. This idea is consistent 
with our findings, in the sense that improved contact between migrants and their 
networks at origin is likely to deepen migrants’ integration in these networks, a 
mechanism that is complementary to remittances in this framework.2 
In the remainder of the paper, Section 2 describes our experimental design and 
the identification strategy. Section 3 presents the data collection procedure, 
summary statistics, and a discussion of balance at baseline. Section 4 discusses the 
econometric model and the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Experimental design and identification strategy 
In order to quantitatively assess the role of communication flows in 
determining the extent and value of remittance flows between migrants and their 
contacts abroad, we implement a randomized field experiment, which consists of 
distributing international calling credit to a randomly selected treatment group. The 
international calling credit could be used to contact any number outside of Ireland, 
either landline or mobile, with the objective of increasing the communication flows 
between immigrants in Ireland and their family and friends outside of Ireland. The 
cost of the international calling credit was about € 0.12 per minute and it was not 
disclosed to the participants.3 However, the actual value of the calling credit to the 
                                                      
 
2 A related branch of literature examines the role of networks and information on migration 
behavior. Notable recent examples of this line of work are McKenzie and Rapoport (2007), Beine et 
al. (2011), Aker, Clemens, and Ksoll (2012), Umblijs (2012), Elsner, Narciso, and Thijssen (2013), 
Farre and Fasani (2013) and Beam, McKenzie and Yang (2013). 
3 The international calling credit was provided by Swiftcall/Ninetel.  
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respondent could vary, depending on the destination country. For example, a phone 
call from Ireland to South Africa could cost between €1.12 and €1.26 per minute 
with the main Irish operator (Eircom), while the cost of a call to Poland was about 
€0.39 per minute.4  
Participants in the experiment were randomly assigned to one of three groups. 
Respondents in Treatment group 1 received 90 minutes of free international calling 
credit every month, for five months. Migrants in Treatment group 2 received 90 
minutes of free international calling credit for three months (every other month). 
Finally, one-third of the participants were assigned to the Control group. Differences 
in the remittance behavior between the treated and control groups will allow for 
identification of the intention-to-treat (ITT) effects of our intervention. Differences 
between the two treatment groups would arise as a result of the treatment frequency. 
Upon completion of the baseline survey, participants were contacted by 
Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) every month for a period of five 
months. The aim of the short (about 15 minutes in duration) monthly surveys was to 
gather information about remittance behavior, contacts with family and friends 
outside of Ireland, and the main topics of conversation. The monthly top-up of the 
international calling credit was also provided to the treatment group upon 
completion of the short monthly survey.  
About six to nine months after the fifth monthly survey, the final round of the 
survey was conducted, with participants interviewed by CATI to elicit information 
about remittance behavior. Figure 1 outlines the timeline adopted for the various 
surveys and the intervention.  
 
                                                      
 
4 http://www.eircom.ie/bveircom/pdf/Part2.1.pdf 
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Figure 1: Timeline 
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3. Data collection and summary statistics 
3.1 Data collection 
The data used in our analysis consist of a representative household sample of 
1,500 immigrants5, aged 18 years or older, residing in the greater Dublin area, who 
arrived in Ireland between the year 2000 and six months prior to the interview date. 
The baseline sample was collected between February 2010 and December 2011. 
Survey activities were conducted by Amarach Research, a reputable survey 
company with experience conducting research surveys in Ireland, under the close 
supervision of the authors and their research team. 
Eligibility requirements for survey respondents were set to maximize the 
probability that migrants still kept contacts outside of Ireland (hence the 2000 initial 
arrival threshold) but were already minimally established in Ireland (for at least six 
months) so that contacts with their networks abroad could provide useful 
                                                      
 
5 Immigrants in our sample are defined as not being Irish or British citizens. British citizens were 
excluded due to the close historical ties between Ireland and Great Britain, which still entitle British 
citizens to vote at parliamentary elections, for instance. 
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information. Due to missing relevant information about eligibility for nine 
respondents, the final sample size is 1,491.  
Random sampling was performed in the following way. First, 100 Enumeration 
Areas (EAs) were randomly selected out of the 323 Electoral Districts in the greater 
Dublin area. This selection was performed according to probability-proportional-to-
size sampling, in which size is defined as the total number of non-Irish and non-
British individuals residing in Ireland, according to the 2006 Census of Ireland. 
Second, 15 households were selected within each EA using a random route 
approach.6 Finally, in the presence of more than one eligible respondent in the 
household, the individual respondent was randomly selected based on a next-
birthday rule. In the absence of the designated respondent, an appointment was set 
up for a later date. According to the enumeration records, on average, the 
interviewers had to approach around 100 addresses to obtain one completed 
interview.  
All enumerators were initially trained by the research team and were 
subsequently supervised by the survey company and, randomly, by members of the 
research team. Each enumerator had to complete an enumeration report, listing 
each address approached, the number of call-backs and the outcome of each visit. 
The enumeration reports were closely inspected and verified by the research team. If 
the randomization instructions were not followed, interviews had to be replaced.  
 
                                                      
 
6 Each enumerator was given a map of the assigned EA and a pre-selected random starting address 
within the allocated EA. After a successful interview, enumerators were instructed to exit the house, 
turn left, count five houses down and approach this new address. A set of standard rules were given 
in the case of cross-roads, apartment buildings, and cul de sac. In the case of an absent household, 
interviewers were requested to call back to the address for a maximum of five times, at different 
times of the day and different days of the week. Each call-back was recorded on the interviewer’s 
report. When an address was exhausted after five call-backs, or deemed ineligible, or in the case of 
a refusal, the interviewer followed predefined instructions in order to get the next address, namely 
the address next door to the left when exiting the house. 
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3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the distribution of the top seven nationalities in our baseline 
sample. Just over 19% of our sample is of Nigerian origin, while over 10% consists of 
migrants of Polish nationality. In total, the sample covers 101 nationalities. Table A1 
in the Appendix presents the full list of nationalities.  
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for a set of basic demographic 
characteristics of migrants for both treatment and control groups at baseline. The 
average participant age is 32 and a slight majority of respondents is female. About 
42% of the respondents are married and the average length of stay in Ireland is five 
years. A large majority of respondents have parents living in the country of origin. 
Survey participants report a high degree of education, with about 70% having a post-
secondary degree or higher, and 28% having a secondary school degree. About 75% 
of the respondents in our sample are employed, compared to 51.4% of the overall 
population in Ireland in 2011 (ILO). The net monthly income earned by surveyed 
individuals is around €1,200 per month, with an average of 23 working hours per 
week. About half of the respondents planned to return to their home country in five 
years or less at the moment of arrival. However, when asked about their current 
intentions to move away from Ireland, less than 40% of the respondents intended to 
leave the host country in the following five years. 
The baseline survey also provides extensive information regarding the 
transnational network of migrants, namely the size of this network, the cost of 
keeping in contact with it, whether remittances are sent and, if so, the amount 
remitted. As shown at the bottom of Table 2, on average, respondents are in contact 
with two people living outside of Ireland and the monthly cost of contacting the 
network abroad is just below €40. About one-third of the participants in our sample 
send remittances, with a monthly amount of remittances averaging around €47 (and 
over €125 if we restrict to positive amounts only).  
We do not find any evidence of statistically significant differences between 
control and treatment groups for any of the described variables at baseline.  
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4. Estimation strategy 
In order to estimate the effect on remittance behavior of increased information 
flows between migrants and their network outside of the host country, we focus on 
two main dependent variables - the probability of remitting (extensive margin) and 
the value of monthly remittances (intensive margin). The design of the RCT and 
multiple-round survey we conducted allows us to estimate the effect of the treatment 
in two ways. First, we adopt a single difference approach by analyzing the post-
intervention data (rounds 2 to 7 of the survey) and we estimate the following 
specification: 
 
0 3it i t itTβ β ϑ ε= + + + +Y iX 'δ  (1) 
 
where Yit is either an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the migrant remits 
and 0 otherwise, or the amount of monthly remittances sent by respondent i at time 
t, where t is the time of the intervention period (round 2 to round 7 of the survey). Xi  
is a vector of individual baseline characteristics: age, employment status, marital 
status, gender, number of individuals regularly contacted abroad, average monthly 
cost of calling network abroad, post-secondary education, whether the parents of the 
respondent are alive and live outside of Ireland, number of years in Ireland, 
continent of origin, and enumeration area fixed effects. Finally, tϑ  represents survey 
round fixed effects.  
Given the availability of pre-intervention data on outcome variables from the 
baseline survey, we also use a difference-in-differences approach and estimate the 
following specification:  
 
0 1 2 3 *it i t i t t itT post T postβ β β β ϑ ε= + + + + + +Y iX 'δ  (2) 
 
where tpost  is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 for post-intervention 
period (rounds 2 to 7) and 0 for the pre-intervention period (round 1). Yit, Xi and tϑ  
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are defined as before. As a further robustness check, we estimate a difference-in-
differences specification with individual fixed effects ( iδ ):  
 
2 3 *it t i t i t itpost T postβ β δ ϑ ε= + + + +Y  (3) 
 
where the impact of increased communication flows is captured by the 3β  
coefficient.  
In both specifications, we are interested in identifying the intention-to-treat 
effect, i.e. the impact of the treatment Ti on remittance behavior variable Yit, which is 
given by the coefficient 3β . Regular least squares estimates are used to estimate 3β . 
Standard errors are always clustered at the enumeration area level. 
 
5. Econometric results 
5.1 Exogenous variation in communication flows 
We begin the empirical analysis by showing that the experimental intervention 
effectively increased communication flows between migrants and their network 
abroad. Table 3 reports the impact of the treatment on the extent of the information 
flows. The monthly CATI interviews reported information about the number of 
individuals contacted abroad, number of calls made, and conversation topics the 
migrant discussed with his/her transnational network in the month prior to the 
interview.7 On average, respondents in the treatment group contact more people, 
make a greater number of calls and talk about a larger number of topics regarding 
both Ireland and the country of residence of the contact person. Overall it seems 
that the international calling credit was effective in increasing the communication 
flows between migrants and their network abroad.  
                                                      
 
7 These conversation topics include the level of wages, opportunities to find a job, cost of living, 
regulation for foreign migrants, unemployment benefits and other social benefits, health care 
system, education system, and taxes both in Ireland and in the country of residence of the contact 
person.  
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5.2 Effect on remittances 
Table 4 shows differences in average remittance behavior between treatment 
and control groups using the monthly follow-up survey data. The difference in 
remittance behavior between groups is positive and statistically significant in 
various dimensions: a 20% higher share of respondents in the treatment group 
sends remittances, the value of remittances is more than 50% higher for treated 
than for control migrants, and the number of remittance recipients is nearly 25% 
larger.  
We investigate further the relationship between increased communication 
flows and remittances. Table 5 reports the results of the single difference 
estimation of specification (1) for the extensive margin, i.e. the probability of 
remitting, using a linear probability model. The dependent variable in this 
specification is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent sends 
monthly remittances and 0 otherwise. We find that the treatment has a positive and 
statistically significant impact on the probability of remitting; treated migrants are 
5.3% more likely to remit than respondents in the control group – an effect that is 
robust to the inclusion of demographic and communication controls, as well as 
survey round fixed effects. The estimated coefficient is still statistically significant, 
although only at a 10% level, when we introduce enumeration area fixed effects 
(column 4) and continent of origin fixed effects (column 5).  
The strongest results in our analysis arise when we analyze the impact of the 
increased communication flows on the value of monthly remittances. Column (1) of 
Table 6 presents the effect that providing additional free calling credit to 
individuals in the treatment group has on the value of monthly remittances. This 
impact is positive and highly statistically significant; treated migrants increase the 
amount of monthly remittances sent to their transnational network by about €40. 
Adding demographic and communication controls in column (2) slightly increases 
the magnitude of the treatment impact, without changing its statistical significance. 
In columns (3)-(5) we progressively add survey round fixed effects (column 3), 
enumeration area fixed effects (column 4), and continent of origin fixed effects 
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(column 5). Treated migrants are still found to remit more than respondents in the 
control group; the average treatment effect in the specification with all controls 
and fixed effects included is about €45, as shown in column (5).  
Overall, we conclude that the increased communication flows produce a 
strong, significant increase in the amount of remittances sent (intensive margin) 
and also a smaller increase in the probability of remitting (extensive margin).  
 
5.3 Two treatments 
As described in Section 2, the two treatment groups in the experimental 
intervention differ only in the frequency of the calling credit top-up. Migrants in 
Treatment group 1 received a monthly calling credit top-up, for a total of five 
months. Respondents in Treatment group 2 received a calling credit top-up every 
other month, for a total of three times over five months.  
Table 7 reports the results of the estimation of equation (1) differentiating 
between the two treatments. Both treatments have a statistically significant impact 
on the amount of remittances, with an estimated average treatment effect between 
€32 and €39 for treatment 1 and between €45 and €50 for treatment 2, depending 
on the specification.  
Columns (3) and (4) report the impact of the two treatments on the probability 
of remitting. The two treatments increase the probability of sending remittances, 
although the effect is no longer significant once we add the control variables and 
the set of fixed effects.  
The lower panel of Table 7 reports the test of equality of the coefficients of 
the two treatments; we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two coefficients 
are equal in any of the specifications, for either the intensive or the extensive 
margin. We therefore conclude that there is no statistically significant difference 
between the two treatments and proceed by evaluating the joint impact of the two 
treatments in the remainder of the analysis.  
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5.4 Difference-in-differences estimation 
The analysis presented so far made use of the post-intervention data, i.e. 
survey rounds 2 to 7. Using the baseline survey allows us to also adopt a difference-
in-differences estimation strategy. Column (1) of Table 8 reports the estimation 
results for the specification detailed in equation (2). The estimated ITT effect (the 
coefficient on the interaction between the treatment and the post-intervention 
indicator) takes a positive and statistically significant value; treated migrants send 
€43 more remittances than the control group. Column (2) presents the specification 
outlined in equation (3), i.e. a difference-in-differences specification with 
individual fixed effects, in addition to the survey round fixed effects already 
included in column (1). The estimated coefficient of interest keeps a similar 
positive magnitude with statistical significance at the 5% significance level. 
Columns (3) and (4) replicate the analysis for the extensive margin. We do not find 
any statistically significant impact of the treatment on the probability of remitting.  
We summarize by stating that the treatment had a strong effect on the 
intensive margin, while its impact on the extensive margin appears less robust. In 
the next section, we analyze some of the possible mechanisms at play.  
 
6. Robustness checks 
6.1. Is it just a substitution effect? 
Are migrants simply substituting the decreased costs of calling with 
remittances? In order to tackle this potential alternative explanation of our findings, 
we make use of the baseline information on the average monthly cost of calling. 
Column (1) in Table 9 reports a single-difference specification similar to equation (1), 
which now also includes the interaction between the treatment indicator and the 
monthly average cost of calling.8 The results hold when we control for this 
interaction term: treated migrants are found to remit more than migrants in the 
                                                      
 
8 The monthly average of the cost of calling is included in the list of communication controls used 
in all regression specifications.  
15 
 
control group and the estimated coefficient is still statistically significant at the 5% 
level, while the interaction term between the treatment and the communication costs 
is not statistically significant. Columns (2) and (3) present the results of the 
difference-in-differences estimation with the interaction terms with the 
communication costs, with and without individual fixed effects (columns 2 and 3 
respectively). Besides the positive impact of the treatment on the value of monthly 
remittances, it is worth noting that the triple interaction term between the treatment, 
the average communication costs and the after intervention indicator is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The greater the communication costs between 
migrants and their network abroad, the lower the impact of the treatment on the 
value of monthly remittances. This result holds again when we control for individual 
fixed effects in column (3). We can therefore refute a substitution effect between the 
decreased costs of communication elicited by the experiment and remittance 
behavior.  
A similar pattern emerges in the analysis of the impact of the treatment on the 
extensive margin. Treated migrants are about 8% more likely to remit, once we 
control for the interaction between the treatment and the average cost of calling, as 
can be seen in column (4). The estimated coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. This result also holds when we consider the difference-in-
differences analysis and we control for individual fixed effects.  
 
6.2 Interpretation of the findings 
The increased communication flows might improve migrant’s control over 
remittance use and enhance trust in remittance channels due to experience sharing. 
If this were the case, we would expect treated migrants who are regularly employed 
and who have higher income to send more remittances – the assumption being that 
these individuals are more likely to have the financial liquidity to send more 
remittances should they wish to do so. The next two tables test this hypothesis and 
focus on the interaction between the employment status dummy and the treatment 
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indicator (Table 10) and, as a further robustness check, the interaction between 
income and the treatment indicator (Table 11).  
The estimation results confirm the hypothesis: treated migrants who are 
employed tend to remit more, while no effect is found on the probability of 
remitting. A similar result emerges when we consider the interaction with the 
income variable. The larger the earned income, the larger the increase in the amount 
of money remitted by treated migrants. Again, no effect is found on the probability 
of remitting. 
 
6.3 Follow up surveys and attrition 
Migrants are mobile by definition and given the length of the project,9 
selective attrition could be a cause of concern. Respondents in the treatment group 
received international calling credit at the end of the baseline survey and upon 
completion of short phone surveys. We therefore anticipated a higher dropout rate 
in the control group relative to the treatment group.10 A higher dropout rate in the 
control group is indeed confirmed by the attrition analysis presented in Table 12. 
About 50% of the respondents in Treatment group 1 dropped out, compared to 
51% of Treatment group 2 and 56% of the control group. The difference in the 
dropout rates between Treatment group 1 and the control group is statistically 
significant for each round of the survey. However, the difference in dropout rates 
between Treatment group 2 and the control group is only (marginally) statistically 
different in the last round.  
To exclude the possibility of selective attrition, we evaluate the difference 
between treatment and control dropouts relative to the set of observable variables 
presented in the descriptive statistics. We focus on the participants who dropped 
out after the first round of the survey. The results of this analysis are presented in 
                                                      
 
9 More than one year went by between the first baseline and last follow-up interviews. 
10 In order to counter dropout rates, we provided incentives to participate in the project by offering 
five lottery prizes with a €100 value and a final lottery prize of €500 that were highly advertised by 
the enumerators. 
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Table 13. We find no evidence of selective attrition, as the difference between the 
control group and each of the treatment groups is never statistically significant, 
apart from one (marginal) instance. These results are reassuring in terms of the 
validity of the analysis.  
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
Our results show that improving communication flows between migrants and 
their networks abroad may promote more migrant remittances. In particular, we 
identify a significant positive increase in the value of remittances sent (which nearly 
doubles relative to baseline) as a result of experimentally subsidizing communication 
between migrants and their networks outside of the immigration country. However, 
we however find only a relatively small (about 25% relative to baseline) increase in 
the probability of migrants in our sample sending remittances to a larger number of 
individuals in their network.  
Even though our research design did not explicitly test for the mechanisms 
underlying this finding, our analysis shows that we can confidently exclude that the 
remittance effect we identify is a simple substitution effect, whereby those with 
higher subsidized communication costs increase their remittance flows by more. 
Indeed, we find that larger remittance responses are associated with individuals 
who are employed and earn higher incomes. This evidence is consistent with the 
idea that the observed increase in remittances is not a consequence of relaxed 
budget constraints due to subsidized communication costs, but rather a likely 
result of improved information - perhaps due to better migrant control over 
remittance use, enhanced trust in remittance channels due to experience sharing, 
or increased remittance recipients’ social pressure on migrants. While additional 
research is necessary to distinguish the different mechanisms potentially at play, 
we believe this paper achieves an important first step in showing in a rigorous 
experimental way, that information flows do play a role in determining migrant 
behavior. 
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The findings of our work highlight the importance of investment in technology 
that increases the reach and efficiency of communication flows. In addition to other 
beneficial effects already documented in the literature, such an investment may be 
valuable to developing countries with substantial emigration stocks, as there may be 
increased remittances flowing back to these migration countries of origin. 
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Table	  1:	  Country	  of	  birth	  of	   foreign-­‐born	  individuals	   in	  sample.	  
	   	  
Nigeria	   19.52%	  
	   	  
Poland	   10.87%	  
	   	  
India	   6.10%	  
	   	  
South	  Africa	   4.83%	  
	   	  
Romania	   4.23%	  
	   	  
Brazil	   3.62%	  
	   	  
Philippines	   3.09%	  
	   	  
 
	  
	   	  
Table 2: Characteristics of respondents 
Variable Treatment Control Difference 
 Mean Mean T-C (S.E.) 
    
Age 32.80 32.20 0.60 (0.436) 
    
Female      0.55     0.52     0.03 (0.03) 
    
Married 0.42 0.42 0.00 (0.03) 
    
Years in IRL 5.37 5.29 0.09 (0.15) 
    
College 0.69 0.72 -0.03 (0.03) 
    
Secondary 0.28 0.27 0.01 (0.02) 
    
Employed 0.75 0.76 -0.01 (0.02) 
    
Number of children 0.96 0.88 0.08 (0.07) 
    
Parents living in CO 0.84 0.83 0.01 (0.02) 
    
Net monthly income (in 
Euro) 
1,165 1,193 -28 (63.94) 
    
Number of. working 
hours per week 
22.94 24.32 -1.38 (0.96) 
    
Intended to return  in 5 
years or less at arrival 
0.51 0.53 -0.02 (0.02) 
    
Currently intends to 
return  in 5 years or less 
0.38 0.36 0.03 (0.03) 
    
Number of individuals 
contacted abroad 
2.29 2.19 0.10 (0.07) 
    
Monthly communication 
costs (in Euro) 
38.75 35.48 3.27 (2.32) 
    
Remitted in previous 
year 
0.36 0.32 0.04 (0.03) 
    
Value of monthly 
remittances in previous 
year (in Euro) 
47.79 47.62 0.17 (7.68) 
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
	  
	  
	   	  
Table 3: Effect of treatment on communication flows (monthly data) 
 Treatment Control Difference (S.E) 
 Mean Mean T-C 
Number of individuals 
contacted abroad!
2.84 2.45 0.38*** (0.08) 
    
Nr. of calls per month 17.21 14.71 2.48** (0.91) 
    
Nr of topics talked about per 
month - host country issues 
3.92 2.91 1.01*** (0.14) 
    
Nr of topics talked about per 
month - abroad country 
issues 
3.97 3.00 0.97*** (0.13) 
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
	  
	   	  
Table 4: Effect of the treatment on remittance behavior (monthly data) 
 Treatment Control Difference T-C 
 Mean Mean  (S.E.) 
    
Remittances sent  0.26 0.22      0.04*** 
(indicator variable)   (0.014) 
    
Value of monthly 
remittances (in Euro) 
71.09 45.96      25.13***  
(8.81) 
    
Number of remittance  0.41 0.33      0.08***  
recipients   (0.03) 
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
	  
	   	  
Table 5: Extensive margin – Single difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Monthly remittances – indicator variable 
      
Treatment 0.053** 0.055** 0.052** 0.048* 0.043* 
 [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.025] [0.025] 
      
Demographic and No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Communication 
Controls 
     
Round FE No No Yes Yes Yes 
EA FE No No No Yes Yes 
Continent FE No No No No Yes 
      
Observations 2702 2639 2639 2639 2639 
Adjusted R-squared 0.003 0.010 0.016 0.043 0.052 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Demographic and communication controls include employment status, age, 
post-secondary degree or college dummy, whether parents are alive and live abroad, gender, number of 
contacts abroad, average monthly cost of calling, length of stay in Ireland. Standard errors are clustered at the 
enumeration area level. 
	  
	   	  
Table 6: Intensive margin – Single difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Value of monthly remittances 
      
Treatment 38.082*** 40.759*** 42.048*** 45.389** 44.562** 
 [14.160] [14.683] [14.945] [18.387] [17.869] 
      
Demographic and No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Communication 
Controls 
     
Round FE No No Yes Yes Yes 
EA FE No No No Yes Yes 
Continent FE No No No No Yes 
      
Observations 2702 2639 2639 2639 2639 
Adjusted R-squared 0.003 0.014 0.014 0.028 0.038 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Demographic and communication controls include employment status, age, 
post-secondary degree or college dummy, whether parents are alive and live abroad, gender, number of 
contacts abroad, average monthly cost of calling, length of stay in Ireland. Standard errors are clustered at the 
enumeration area level.  
	   	  
Table 7: Treatment 1 vs. Treatment 2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Value of monthly 
remittances 
Monthly remittances – Indicator 
variable 
     
Treatment 1 31.892** 39.335** 0.056** 0.038 
 [15.047] [19.368] [0.025] [0.027] 
     
Treatment 2 45.443** 50.487** 0.049* 0.047 
 [21.139] [23.071] [0.027] [0.031] 
     
Demographic and No Yes No Yes 
Communication Controls     
Round FE No Yes No Yes 
EA FE No Yes No Yes 
Continent FE No Yes No Yes 
     
Test of equality (p-value) 0.5485 0.6241 0.7758 0.7492 
     
Observations 2702 2639 2702 2639 
Adjusted R-squared 0.003 0.038 0.003 0.052 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Demographic and communication controls include employment 
status, age, post-secondary degree or college dummy, whether parents are alive and live abroad, 
gender, number of contacts abroad, average monthly cost of calling, length of stay in Ireland. 
Standard errors are clustered at the enumeration area level. 
	   	  
Table 8: Difference-in-differences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Value of monthly 
remittances 
Monthly remittances – dummy 
variable 
     
Treatment* Post 42.522** 38.541** 0.016 0.029 
 [16.338] [16.702] [0.031] [0.034] 
     
Post -29.499 -1.218 -0.043 -0.175*** 
 [27.019] [15.823] [0.046] [0.038] 
     
Treatment -2.227  0.025  
 [8.094]  [0.025]  
     
Demographic and 
Communication Controls Yes No Yes No 
Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
EA FE Yes No Yes No 
Continent FE Yes No Yes No 
Individual FE No Yes No Yes 
     
Observations 4089 4160 4089 4160 
Adjusted R-squared 0.033 0.006 0.098 0.048 
Number of id  1473  1473 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Demographic and communication controls include 
employment status, age, post-secondary degree or college dummy, whether parents are 
alive and live abroad, gender, number of contacts abroad, average monthly cost of 
calling, length of stay in Ireland. Standard errors are clustered at the enumeration area 
level. 
	  
	   	  
Table 9: Cost of calling 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Value of monthly remittances Monthly remittances - dummy 
       
Treatment 57.656** -5.415  0.079** 0.011  
 [22.460] [13.525]  [0.031] [0.041]  
       
Treatment* Post  66.454*** 58.377***  0.088** 0.091** 
  [19.097] [19.807]  [0.041] [0.046] 
       
Treatment*Avg. cost   -1.221*** -1.057**  -0.004** -0.003* 
of Calling*Post  [0.382] [0.489]  [0.001] [0.002] 
       
Treatment*  -0.734 0.115  -0.002* 0.001  
Avg. cost of Calling [0.518] [0.428]  [0.001] [0.002]  
       
Post  -31.424 5.511  -0.049 -0.187*** 
  [27.179] [9.264]  [0.046] [0.032] 
       
Avg. cost of calling 0.335 0.558**  0.002 0.003***  
 [0.451] [0.272]  [0.001] [0.001]  
       
Demographic and  Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Communication 
Controls 
      
Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
EA FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Continent FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Individual FE No No Yes No No Yes 
       
Specification Single 
difference 
DID DID Single 
difference 
DID DID 
Observations 2639 4089 4108 2639 4089 4108 
Adjusted R-squared 0.038 0.034 0.005 0.054 0.104 0.048 
Number of id   1458   1458 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Demographic and communication controls include employment 
status, age, post-secondary degree or college dummy, whether parents are alive and live abroad, 
gender, number of contacts abroad, length of stay in Ireland. Standard errors are clustered at the 
enumeration area level. 
	  
	   	  
Table 10: Interaction with Employed dummy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Value of monthly remittances Monthly remittances - Indicator 
Treatment*Employed   54.413*** 57.024***  -0.034 -0.037 
*Post  [20.105] [21.670]  [0.043] [0.056] 
       
Treatment*Post  2.357 -5.430  0.042 0.059 
  [12.648] [13.438]  [0.045] [0.054] 
       
Treatment*Employed 36.761 -13.736  -0.015 0.004  
 [26.655] [16.272]  [0.047] [0.043]  
       
Treatment 16.827 7.872  0.054 0.023  
 [16.801] [13.700]  [0.044] [0.042]  
       
Employed 11.042 14.772  0.067 0.075**  
 [20.040] [13.976]  [0.044] [0.031]  
       
Post  -29.538 5.511  -0.043 -0.187*** 
  [27.105] [9.264]  [0.046] [0.032] 
       
Specification Single 
difference 
DID DID Single 
difference 
DID DID 
Demographic and 
Communication 
Controls 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
EA FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Continent FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Individual FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 2639 4089 4160 2639 4089 4160 
Adjusted R-squared 0.038 0.034 0.005 0.052 0.098 0.043 
Number of individuals   1473   1473 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Demographic and communication controls include 
employment status, age, post-secondary degree or college dummy, whether parents are alive 
and live abroad, gender, number of contacts abroad, length of stay in Ireland. Standard errors 
are clustered at the enumeration area level. 
Table 11: Interaction with Income 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Value of monthly remittances Monthly remittances - Indicator 
Treatment*Income   0.035* 0.036*  -0.000 -0.000 
*Post  [0.019] [0.019]  [0.000] [0.000] 
       
Treatment*Post  -1.807 -9.567  0.015 0.026 
  [15.442] [16.857]  [0.040] [0.047] 
       
Treatment*Income 0.041** 0.001  0.000 0.000  
 [0.018] [0.007]  [0.000] [0.000]  
       
Treatment -8.274 -3.847  0.013 0.021  
 [18.593] [12.075]  [0.038] [0.037]  
       
Income -0.003 0.003  -0.000 0.000 -0.003 
 [0.008] [0.007]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.008] 
       
Post  -14.237 5.477  -0.187*** -
0.198*** 
  [16.738] [9.817]  [0.036] [0.033] 
       
Specification Single 
difference 
DID DID Single 
difference 
DID DID 
Demographic and 
Communication 
Controls Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
EA FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Continent FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Individual FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 2445 3771 3829 2445 3771 3829 
Adj. R-squared 0.040 0.036 0.006 0.058 0.109 0.052 
Number of 
individuals 
  1343   1343 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Demographic and communication controls include age, post-
secondary degree or college dummy, whether parents are alive and live abroad, gender, 
number of contacts abroad, length of stay in Ireland. Standard errors are clustered at the 
enumeration area level. 
 
Table 12: Attrition 
 
Control Treatment 1 
Difference to 
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
Difference to 
Treatment 2 
 Mean     
Dropout – 3 rounds 0.56 0.51 0.05* 
(0.03) 
0.51 0.05 
(0.03) 
Dropout – 4 rounds 0.67 0.60 0.07** 
(0.030) 
0.63 0.04 
(0.03) 
Dropout – 5 rounds 0.74 0.65 0.09*** 
(0.03) 
0.71 0.03 
(0.03) 
Dropout – 6 rounds 0.78 0.70 0.08*** 
(0.03) 
0.75 0.02 
(0.03) 
Dropout – 7 rounds 0.89 0.82 0.07 
(0.02)*** 
0.85 0.04 
(0.02)* 
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
	  
	  
	   	  
Table 13: Analysis of the dropouts  
Variable Control Treatment 1 
Difference to 
Treatment 1 
Treatment 2 Difference to 
Treatment 2 
 Mean     
      
Age 32.35 32.40 -0.04 
(0.70) 
33.27 -0.92 
(0.71) 
      
Female 0.54 0.58 -0.04 
(0.04) 
0.52 0.02 
(0.04) 
      
Married 0.37 0.40 -0.02 
(0.04) 
0.43 -0.05 
(0.04) 
      
Years in IRL 5.27 5.39 -0.12 
(0.24) 
5.47 -0.20 
(0.25) 
      
College 0.70 0.68 0.02 
(0.04) 
0.67 0.03 
(0.04) 
      
Secondary 0.28 0.29 -0.01 
(0.04) 
0.29 -0.01 
(0.04) 
      
Employed 0.77 0.75 0.02 
(0.04) 
0.76 0.00 
(0.04) 
      
Nr. Children 0.83 0.95 -0.12 
(0.11) 
0.85 -0.03 
(0.10) 
      
Parents living 
in CO 
0.80 0.83 -0.03 
(0.03) 
0.86 -0.06* 
(0.03) 
      
Monthly Net 
Income 
1,237.21 1,172.48 64.73 
(100.96) 
1,227.738 9.48 
(104.56) 
      
Nr working 
hours 
25.18 23.63 1.55 
(1.52) 
23.98 1.20 
(1.59) 
      
Intentions to 
stay for less 
than 5 years – 
at arrival 
0.53 0.51 0.02 
(0.04) 
0.49 0.04 
(0.04) 
      
Current 
intention to 
return – in 5 
years or less 
0.39 0.39 -0.00 
(0.04) 
0.38 0.01 
(0.04) 
      
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
